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This article is a supplement to our recent one about the analysis of the noise properties in the 
Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system [Gingl and Mingesz, PLOS 
ONE 9 (2014) e96109, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0096109]. Here we use purely mathematical 
statistical derivations to prove that only normal distribution with special scaling can guarantee 
security. Our results are in agreement with earlier physical assumptions [Kish, Phys. Lett. A 
352 (2006) 178-182, doi: 10.1016/j.physleta.2005.11.062]. Furthermore, we have carried out 
numerical simulations to show that the communication is clearly unsecure for improper 
selection of the noise properties. Protection against attacks using time and correlation analysis 
is not considered in this paper. 
Keywords: KLJN; secure key exchange; unconditionally secure communication; secure key 
distribution; noise  
INTRODUCTION 
At present the security of the communication is mostly provided by softwa-
re-based cryptographic solutions. Since the security is ensured only by the 
assumption that the eavesdropper does not have enough processing 
capability to break the code, considerable efforts have been made to develop 
unconditionally secure communication protocols. One promising research 
area is the quantum encryption, where security is based on the laws of 
quantum mechanics. However, recently an alternative communication 
scheme has been proposed, the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) 
protocol, which is based only on the laws of classical physics [2]. One of the 
he main advantages of the KLJN protocol is that it can provide at least the 
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same security as quantum systems at orders of magnitude lower cost. 
Although until now there are only a few real implementations of the system 
[3,4], many potential applications, such as key distribution over Smart Grid 
[5], uncloneable hardware keys [6] or securing computer hardware [7] have 
been proposed. While several attack methods have been discussed [8-13], 
the debate is still going on concerning the security of the system [14, 15]. 
The simplified diagram of the communication system is shown on Fig. 1. 
During the key exchange both Alice and Bob randomly select a L or H bit 
value.. Then, they select the corresponding resistor (RL and RH) and connect 
it to the wire. The noise sources, VL(t) and VH(t) represent the thermal noise 
of the resistors. During the communication, the voltage and current noise 
measured in the wire (VE(t) and IE(t)) are determined by the selected 
resistors and can be measured not only by Alice and Bob, but also by the 
eavesdropper, Eve. The security of the system is based on the assumption 
that even if Eve can measure these signals, she cannot differentiate between 
the LH state and HL state. 
 
Fig. 1. Simplified diagram of the KLJN system (HL state is shown) 
In real applications the thermal noise of resistors is too low; therefore, 
voltage noise generators are typically used to emulate high enough 
temperature [13]. It has already been stated that the security requires the 
use of Johnson-like noise, namely the noise must have normal distribution 
and the standard deviance must be scaled as the root of the resistance [2]. 
We have proven this statement using purely mathematical statistical tools 
[1], and in the present article we will show that these noise properties not 
only needed, but also guarantee absolute security against statistical attacks. 
Note that in this paper we do not address protection against attacks based 
on the analysis of the time dependence of the signals. 
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RESULTS 
Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) show the voltage and current values that can be 
measured by the eavesdropper during the two secure states, LH and HL, 
respectively. The notation used in the equations is introduced in Fig. 1. The 
communication is secure if Eve cannot distinguish between these two states. 
The voltage and current measured by Eve in the LH state: 
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The voltage and current signal measured by Eve in the HL state: 
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For secure communication, the joint probability density function 
pLH(IE,VE) and pHL(IE,VE) must be the same. If IE and VE are independent, this is 
satisfied. 
As it has been proven [16], linear combinations YA and YB of two 
independent random variables X1 and X2 in Eq. (3) will be statistically 
independent if and only if each random variable is normally distributed and 
Eq. (4) is satisfied: 
 2211 XAXAYA  and 2211 XBXBYB  , (3) 
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where 1 and 2 are the standard variation of X1 and X1 respectively. In our 
case we obtain: 
 HLBLHAHLE, )()()( RtVRtVtV  and )()()( HALBHLE, tVtVtI  , (5) 
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where VH and VL are the standard deviations of VHA and VLB, respectively. 
Note, that we get a similar equation for the LH case. According to this, the 
distribution of VHA and VLB must be normal, and the scaling of the standard 
deviation must follow the rule: 
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in agreement with the results presented in [1]. We have carried out 
numerical simulations to obtain the joint statistics of IE and VE. We have 
generated 213 samples both for the current and voltage and made scatter 
plots for several cases. Figure 2 demonstrates what happens with the joint 
distribution of IE and VE if Eq. (7) is not satisfied: there is an asymmetry in 
the distribution that depends on the actual state, LH or HL. 
  
Fig. 2. Scatter plot for cases LH (left) and HL(right) using noise with normal distribution if the Eq. (6) is 
not satisfied. RL=1 kΩ, RH=10 kΩ, VH/VL=1,5. 
In order to achieve a secure communication, the linear combination of 
noises must give the same type of probability distribution as the original one 
[1]. Such distributions are called stable distributions, here we consider 
symmetric α-stable distributions that include normal distribution as a 
special case. Assuming distributions symmetric around zero their 
characteristic function is defined by the following equation: 
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where α is the stability parameter in the range from 0 to 2 and w is the 
scaling factor of the probability density function. Note that α = 2 
corresponds to normal distribution and α = 1 corresponds to Cauchy 
distribution. However, according to [16], IE and VE are not independent 
except in the case of normal distribution (α = 2) as can be seen on Fig. 3. 
Note that not all of such distributions have finite variance, therefore the 
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scaling of the noise voltages was based on the scaling factor w which can be 
associated with the voltage noise magnitude and is defined in Eq. (8). Thus, 
the higher and lower noise have scaling factors wVH and wVL, respectively. 
  
  
  
Fig. 3. Scatter plot for case HL using distributions with different values of α. Note that α = 1 and α = 2 
correspond to Cauchy and normal distribution, respectively. RL=1 kΩ, RH=10 kΩ, wVH/wVL = √     . 
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Fig. 4  Scatter plot for cases LH (left) and HL (right) using noise with uniform distribution. RL=1 kΩ, 
RH=10 kΩ, VH/VL = √     . 
CONCLUSION 
We have shown that communication using the KLJN protocol is secure if and 
only if noise voltages with normal distribution are used and the variance of 
the noise voltages follow the scaling defined by Eq. (7). This result is based 
on mathematical statistical derivation and it is in agreement with previous 
results [1,2]. Note that protection against attacks using time and correlation 
analysis is not considered and can be addressed in subsequent publications. 
Further analysis can clarify how the time domain properties of the noise 
influence the security of the system. 
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